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In a costly state verification setup, a principal entering a contract with an ex-post informed agent, as well as 
auditing, has the option of acquiring costly imperfect information about future revenues either before or after the 
contract is agreed. If acquired, information immediately becomes public. We find that it may be optimal to gather 
information either for sure or randomly but only after the contract. When acquired, information improves targeting 
of audit reducing the inefficiencies associated with it. This is obtained by auditing deterministically after favourable 
signal realisations and never after unfavourable ones. When no signal is collected as a result of randomisation in 
information acquisition, audits either occur deterministically or never, depending on whether the principal breaks 
even upon signal acquisition.  Interpreted in the context of tax auditing, the results provide a rationale for the tax 
agencies widespread reliance on presumptive taxation methods. 
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Many contractual relationships are characterised by asymmetric information about states of
nature. If informed agents have to communicate their information to uninformed principals,
because transfers between parties depend on the realisation of the state, the agent may have
an incentive to misreport the true state. Audits are then designed so that uninformed
parties can verify the truthfulness of the report received usually at a cost. However,
as well as auditing, uninformed parties may also decide to spend resources to improve
information regarding the likelihood of future events. Our problem is to determine whether
this information should be collected, and, if so, when should it be collected and in which
way it alters the principal’s ex-post audit strategy.
Many real world examples match our modelling scenario. In a corporate ﬁnance setting,
before providing an extra capital injection to a ﬁrm, an institutional lender may conduct
a credit risk analysis by asking a rating company to produce a public report on the ﬁrm’s
prospective ﬁnancial situation. The actual revenues that accrue after the capital injection are
the managers’ private information, but the lenders’ decision to audit and the ﬁrms’ incentives
in reporting may be inﬂuenced by the rating company’s ex ante assessment. In a tax audit
scenario, tax agencies often collect a variety of information about taxpayers ability to pay
(business conditions, living standard, wealth) before deciding whether to audit them. In an
insurance context, insurers collect information on policyholders characteristics, consumption
choices or history of past claims to categorise them in credit risk classes. The insurer’s
decision to verify the occurrence or the magnitude of damages of the policyholders ﬁling for
claims may be aﬀected by the credit risk class they belong to.
We deal with the above questions by analysing the contract between an agent, who is
costlessly and perfectly informed ex-post about the proﬁtability of a project, and a principal
who can choose to become ex-ante better informed and/or ex-post perfectly informed, both at
a cost. We therefore construct a costly state veriﬁcation model (CSV henceforth) in which,
1either before or after a contract is signed, but before the state is realised, the principal
can improve the information of both parties by acquiring costly public information.1 This
allows us to focus on the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e ne x - a n t ea n de x - p o s ti n f o r m a t i o ng a t h e r i n ga s
alternative policing methods available to the principal, the ﬁrst corresponding to prevention
and the second to punishment.
In this scenario, we ﬁnd that it is best to let the contract condition the signal acquisition
strategy. In particular, it may be optimal to gather information, but only after a contract has
been agreed and never before. Whenever the information cost is not too high, information
gathering occurs either randomly or for sure and audits are deterministic after favourable
signal realisations, while they never occur after unfavourable ones. This is because, relative
to the standard CSV setup, information acquisition produces a ﬁner partition of states and
allows conditioning of repayments and auditsn o tj u s to nt h er e p o r to ft h es t a t eb u ta l s o
on the value of any received signal. For example, with two states - high and low - and
two signals - good and bad - the low revenue state is broken down into a low revenue
plus good signal state and a low revenue plus bad signal state. Due to positive correlation
of signal and state, it is more likely that revenue is high after a good than after a bad
signal. The expected necessary policing cost can then be reduced overall (and the principal’s
participation constraint relaxed) by always auditing low reports after the good signal but
minimally auditing low reports after the bad signal (precisely because the occurrence of a
low state is less likely after a good signal). Thus, signal acquisition reverses the usual result
about optimality of random audits.
The frequency with which a signal is acquired depends on expected returns following
signal collection. If these are just suﬃcient to satisfy the principal’s participation constraint,
then the signal is acquired for sure. If instead they exceed the amount necessary for the
principal to break even, then it is possible to save on signal acquisition cost by reducing the
1We will henceforth refer to the ex-ante public information collected by the principal as a signal about
the state, although it does not have the usual meaning of a privately informed person signalling. It should
be also pointed out that, given that its realisation is public, it makes no diﬀerence who collects the signal.
2frequency of signal collection and setting repayments at their minimal level also in no signal
states. This implies that there is no need for audit both after the bad signal and when,
as a result of randomisation of information acquisition, no signal is collected. If expected
repayments following signal collection are insuﬃcient for the principal to break even, then
more resources can be raised by random signal acquisition and deterministic audits also of
low reports in no signal states. Low reports following a bad signal instead continue to be
unaudited, as low revenues are still more likely to occur relative to those following no signal.
If acquiring information is costless, the preferred audit strategy is no longer necessarily
deterministic. There is an inﬁnite number of equally optimal solutions ranging from
deterministic audit and random signal acquisition to random audit and certain signal
acquisition. This is not so under costly information gathering as the direct cost it involves
makes this strategy suboptimal relative to auditing, thereby leading to deterministic audits.
Our results show the importance of the balance between the cost, informativeness
and strategic eﬀect of the signal. In addition, the timing of signal acquisition has
signiﬁcant eﬀects. Setting the contract after any information acquisition should minimise
incentive problems within the contract since the information asymmetry is minimal at the
time of contract writing. But in fact it is better to sign the contract ﬁr s ta n dl e ti t s
structure determine the signal acquisition strategy, as this allows the use of broader ex-
ante participation constraints. In particular, parties to the contract are willing to sign if on
average they break even across all the information acquisition strategies that may be used.
This allows audits to be targeted only on those state-signal combinations less likely to occur,
which will be audited for sure, neglecting other states, which will never be audited, with a
consequent eﬃciency gain.
Some of these results are reﬂected in the tax audit system observed in some countries
(France, Israel, Italy) where the tax authorities use taxpayer information available to both
themselves and the taxpayer (a signal) to predict tax liability. The tax authority then
concentrates audit on taxpayers who report a tax liability much below that which is predicted.
3In these presumptive tax systems (see Thuronyi (1999) for a survey) the signal may be a
predictor of earnings, such as the occupational group of the taxpayer, or, for small businesses,
characteristics of the business. For personal incomes the characteristics may include wealth
indicators, e.g. ownership of various kinds of property.
The paper is related to the literature on optimal audit strategy in CSV models. This can
be split in two phases. The ﬁrst only considers deterministic monitoring policies (Townsend
(1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)) and ﬁnds that all states with revenues below some critical
level should be audited with probability one, but that higher revenue states should never
be audited and have a constant repayment. In the second phase, Mookherjee and Png
(1989) point out that monitoring for sure all defaulting states is unduly expensive and that
truthtelling can be achieved at a lower cost with random audit. Thus, a general result of
this literature is that stochastic contracts dominate deterministic contracts.
However, these papers all adopt a commitment principle: the principal announces
an audit strategy suﬃcient to induce truthful reports by the agent and then sticks to
it despite it being costly. At the interim stage there could nevertheless be a Pareto
improving renegotiation or a non-cooperative solution altering the nature of the optimal audit
strategy. While a non-cooperative solution will still involve random auditing (Khalil, 1997),
a renegotiation which must be acceptable to all types (i.e. there is no interim possibility of
revoking the contract) will instead make deterministic audit emerge as the optimal solution
(Krasa and Villamil, 2000). Our paper envisages then another reason for deterministic
auditing, in a commitment scenario, in the possibility of accessing costly ex-ante information.
In considering ex-ante information acquisition, the paper has some loose links with the
literature on private or social value of precontractual costly information (Crémer and Khalil
(1992), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998)). In this literature
the information can be privately gathered by the agent, and perfectly reveals its type (an
exception is Bennardo (2008)).2 In this way information acquisition can alter the nature
2Okuno et al. (1990) consider the case of the agent having hard private information and ﬁnd conditions
4of the asymmetric information problem faced by the principal (from hidden information to
adverse selection). In our paper the focus is rather diﬀerent, as an imperfectly informative
signal is collected by the principal as part of her policing strategy. This has so far not been
dealt with in existing CSV literature.
The plan of the paper is to outline the assumptions and framework in Section 1, to
analyse the contract problems conditional on timing of information acquisition in section 2,
the generic properties of the optimal contracts is section 3, the case in which no signal is
collected before or after the contract oﬀer in section 4 and 5 respectively, the optimal timing
of information acquisition in section 6. The last section concludes.
1 The Model Assumptions
An agent has an investment project costing I for which he needs to raise funding from a risk
neutral principal.3 The project gives a random return fs, s ∈ {H,L},w i t hfH >I>f L ≥ 0,
with probability πH and πL respectively, πH =1− πL. While on their realisation the agent
learns the revenues of the project for free, the principal can only discover them with certainty
by auditing at a cost cm ≥ 0. A u d i ti so b s e r v a b l ea n dt h er e s u l to fi ti sv e r i ﬁable by third
parties.
At any time the principal can acquire a signal σ ∈ {G,B} at a cost ca ≥ 0 which
is positively correlated with the true state of nature. Signal acquisition is veriﬁable and
contractible, moreover the realised signal value is public information. Then πij represents
the joint probability that s = i and σ = j, and πi|j =P r ( s = i|σ = j) is the conditional
probability of state s = i given that signal σ = j is received. 1 >π ii,πjj >π ij,πji > 0
deﬁnes the requirement of positive correlation (r>0)4 between state and signal. We can
under which he will want to disclose it.
3We model a ﬁnancial contracting relationship, but the setup is general and can be adapted to apply to
a variety of diﬀerent contexts. Mookherjee and Png (1989) provide an interesting interpretation of a similar
problem in a context of taxation.
4The correlation coeﬃcient is r =[ πHGπLB −πHBπLG]/[(πLG + πLB)(1−πLG−πLB)(πHG + πLG)(1−
πHG − πLG)]0.5. So when πHG + πLB =1 ,r= πHGπLB/[πLBπHGπHGπLB]1/2 =1 .
5also measure the sign of the correlation by ρ :
ρ = πHGπLB − πHBπLG
The signal is fully informative if πH|G = πL|B =1 .I nt h i sc a s er =1 . Conversely, the signal
is completely uninformative if πH|G = πH|B and πL|G = πL|B which implies πHG = πHB and
πLG = πLB and then r = ρ =0 . Under our assumptions, a good signal improves the chance
that the state is actually high and vice versa. Note that πs = πsG + πsB,s = H,L and
πσ = πHσ + πLσ,σ= G,B.
We impose a condition which ensures that the ex-ante social beneﬁts of the project cover
the combined cost of signal acquisition and monitoring:5
Assumption 1
EP = πHfH + πLfL − I − πLcm − ca > 0 (1)
This can be decomposed as the sum of EPCσ and EMB, where
EPCσ = πHGfH +( 1− πHG)fL − I − πLGcm − ca (2)
EMB = πHB(fH − fL) − πLBcm (3)
Given commitment to executing the agreed contract, to preserve symmetry between the
right and left hand branch except in the timing of signal acquisition, we assume that it is
proﬁtable to oﬀer a contract even after a bad signal. Thus, for each signal realisation the
expected returns from the project cover the signal cost.6 This allows us to concentrate on
the optimal timing of signal acquisition, abstracting from potential advantages coming from
improvement in information.
Assumption 2
πH|BfH +( 1− πH|B)fL − I − πL|Bcm − ca > 0.7 (4)
5Notice that assuming a ﬁxed cost in signal acquisition and audit gives a bias against small projects which
have low cost and low revenues.
6Note that (4) and fL <Ipreclude the case in which the signal is perfectly informative since then
πH|B =0 .
7Assumptions 1 and 2 imply πH|GfH +( 1− πH|G)fL − I − πL|Gcm − ca > 0.






























































Figure 1: The game tree
Since the parties are risk neutral, acquiring the signal has no risk sharing gain, but the
reduction in uncertainty may have incentive eﬀects and reduce deadweight losses.8
We measure the timing of actions and events relative to the date at which the agent
proposes a contract.9 Either before or after being oﬀered a contract, the principal has the
opportunity of gathering a signal whose outcome is publicly revealed. If the signal is gathered
before the contract, the agent knows its outcome (G,B) and so contracted repayments and
audit probabilities are conditioned on it. If the signal is not gathered before the contract,
the agent knows that the principal may subsequently collect it. Consequently, as well as
repayments and audit strategy, the contract must include a signal acquisition strategy.
The agent has limited liability in that ex-post he can never be asked to repay more than
the revenues of the project in any state.
A general game tree is sketched in Fig. 1. We refer to the two top branches of the ﬁgure
as the left hand branch (the principal initially chooses to acquire the signal before being
oﬀered a contract) and the right hand branch (the agent ﬁrst oﬀers the contract and then
8Generally in costly state veriﬁcation models, if the variance of revenues falls, the amount of monitoring
required to implement truthtelling also falls.
9We take the agent as the contract writer, which gives him potentially greater strategic power than the
principal. Ultimately, though, deadweight losses of signal collection or monitoring come out of his surplus.
7the principal decides whether or not to get the signal). Initially the principal either gets a
signal or does not. If she does, the agent knows its realisation, since the signal is public, and
oﬀers a contract conditional on the signal outcome. Then the true state occurs and the agent
reports either Hr or Lr. Following the agent’s report, the principal chooses whether to audit.
Then, dependent on all these actions and outcomes, repayments are made. Conversely, in
the right hand branch, the principal initially gathers no signal and the agent oﬀers a contract
which includes a signal acquisition strategy. Next, the signal acquisition strategy is played
by the principal and subsequent events are as in the left hand branch.
In each branch the variables written into the contract can depend on subsequent
observable events and actions prior to the repayments actually being made. Hence Rrsσ
is the repayment due following a signal value σ ∈ {G,B}, ar e p o r tr, and an audit which
reveals that the state is s. RrsN is the analogous repayment with no signal acquisition.
Rrσ is the repayment with report r and signal σ, but with no audit. Similarly, RrN is the
analogous repayment with no signal acquisition. Note that since fL <Irepayments must be
nondecreasing in the state for each signal realisation to generate suﬃcient revenue to meet
the participation constraint (RrHσ >R rLσ,R rHN >R rLN). Last, mσ,m N are the contracted
probabilities of audit following play of signal strategy.10
We can solve the problem by backward induction. First, following the right hand branch
of Fig. 1 where no signal has been acquired at the contract date, calculate the optimal
contract and signal acquisition plan in this branch. Then move to the left-hand branch and
compute the optimal contracts given that a signal has been acquired before the contract
date. Finally, by comparing the expected values of these, we can see whether the principal
will choose to acquire the signal before the contract date.
10In principle, these could vary with the reported state, but we show that this does not occur when
repayments are nondecreasing with the state.
82 The contract problems conditional on timing of
signal acquisition
2.1 Signal acquired after the contract has been agreed
Following the right hand branch of Fig. 1, a contract between principal and agent speciﬁes
repayments, audit probabilities and the probability with which information will be gathered.
The agent’s payoﬀ is
EΠA = α
P
σ πσUσ +( 1− α)UN (5)
where
UN = πH (fH − RHN)+πL [fL − (1 − mN)RLN − mNRLLN] (6)
Uσ = πH|σ (fH − RHσ)+πL|σ [fL − (1 − mσ)RLσ − mσRLLσ],σ ∈ {G,B} (7)
The principal’s payoﬀ is
EΠP = α{
P
σ πσPC σ − ca} +( 1− α)PCN − I (8)
where
PC N : πHRHN + πL[(1 − mN)RLN + mN (RLLN − cm)] (9)
PCσ : πH|σRHσ + πL|σ [(1 − mσ)RLσ + mσ (RLLσ − cm)] (10)
For the lender to participate, we require EΠP ≥ 0.
To induce truthful reporting, repayments following a truthful high state report, RHσ,
RHN, must not exceed repayments following a false low state report which can be audited
with probability mσ,m N :
TTσ : RHσ ≤ mσRLHσ +( 1− mσ)RLσ (11)
TTN : RHN ≤ mNRLHN +( 1− mN)RLN (12)
Last, from limited liability:
fH ≥ RHσ,R LHσ,R HN,R LHN
fL ≥ RLσ,R LLσ,R LN,R LLN
(13)
9T h ec o n t r a c tp r o b l e m( Pafter below) sets optimal values of the probability of acquiring
the signal α, the monitoring strategy mσ,m N, and the repayments Rrsσ,R rsN,R rσ,R rN,t o :
max EΠA
s.t. EΠP ≥ 0
to the incentive constraints (11) and (12) and to the limited liability conditions (13).
2.2 Signal acquired before the contract has been agreed
If the principal collects the signal before receiving an oﬀer, the contract problem Pb4 will be
conditional on the received signal σ and will determine Rrsσ,R rσ,m σ to
max Uσ
s.t. PC σ ≥ I + ca
TT σ
and to the relevant limited liability conditions, with Uσ, PC σ and TTσ as deﬁn e di n( 7 ) ,( 1 0 )
and (12). Note that the contract after a particular signal must raise I + ca revenues and no
longer I + αca, as in the contract before the signal.
3 Generic Properties of the Optimal Contract
Whatever the information gathering strategy, optimally each of the contracts Pb4,Pafter will
display some common features:
(i) the participation constraint must bind since otherwise it would be possible to reduce
RHσ,R HN without violating any of the constraints and make the agent better oﬀ;
(ii) the truthtelling constraints must all bind. After allowing for the participation constraint,
the monitoring cost is a deadweight loss which ultimately subtracts from the expected
gain to the agent. So, whatever the detailed structure of repayments, it is optimal
10to minimise the probability of monitoring. From this, it follows both that there must
be maximum punishment for false audited reports and that any relevant truthtelling
constraints must bind.
(iii) in nonaudited low states the repayments RLσ,R LN are set to give zero rent to the agent:
RLσ = RLN = fL. This gives the agent the minimal incentive to cheat: if he cheats
there is a chance he can proﬁtb yfH − RLσ and he is not actually audited.
(iv) in audited low states there is zero rent to the agent: RLLσ = RLLN = fL. This happens
because in all circumstances the ex-ante marginal value of funds is higher to the agent
than to the principal, that is, an extra dollar of investment ex-ante has more than an
expected dollar’s payoﬀ to the agent, since the principal has to meet the audit cost on
the marginal investment.
Thus, with commitment to audit, the contract will always ensure truthful reporting by
the agent. Eﬃcient policing is achieved by demanding maximum repayments in the low state.
But since these are insuﬃcient to recoup the investment plus audit cost, higher repayments on






Demonstration of these properties and all proofs are in the Appendix.
3.1 The “reduced” contract problems
Having established the common properties of the contract, we use these to write the two
contract problems faced by the agent in terms of just high state repayments.
If no signal is acquired before the contract oﬀer, using the generic properties above, the






σ πHσRHσ]+( 1− α)πH (fH − RHN)
11s.t. α{
P
σ (πHσRHσ − πLσmσcm)+πLfL − ca} +( 1− α)(πHRHN + πLfL − πLmNcm)=I
(14)
fH ≥ RHσ,R HN ≥ fL
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
If the signal is acquired before the agent oﬀers the contract then, when the signal has the





πH|σ (fH − RHσ)
s.t. πH|σRHσ + πL|σ(fL − mσcm) − ca = I
fH ≥ RHσ ≥ fL
We ﬁrst determine the remaining properties of the optimal contract (high state repayments
RHσ,R HN, and, in the right hand branch, signal strategy) with the diﬀerent timings of
signal acquisition. We then compare the contracts under ex-ante and ex-post information
gathering. We start with the case where the contract is oﬀered prior to the signal.
4 Optimal signal strategy after the contract
If no information has been gathered before the contract, there are three possible forms of
information gathering with associated high state repayments and audit after the contract:
i. acquire the signal for sure;
ii. never acquire the signal;
iii. play a random strategy for acquiring the signal.
The choice between these depends on the signal acquisition cost, the informativeness of
the signal and also on the relative costs of signal acquisition and monitoring.
124.1 Costly signal acquisition
When the signal is gathered either for sure or randomly (0 <α≤ 1) at a cost ca, am a x i m u m
spread between RHG and RHB is desirable. This is because collecting the signal allows more
accurate targeting of monitoring. In particular, because of the positive correlation between
signal and state (ρ>0), after a G signal there is a higher probability that the high state is
g o i n gt oo c c u r( πH|G >π L|G). Similarly, after σ = B, it is more likely that s = L. Then, since
truthtelling means monitoring has no cash gathering eﬀects, in order to minimise monitoring
cost, it is best to monitor after a G signal, where it is less likely that revenues are low, rather
than after a B signal. So the optimal contract must involve RHG = fH and RHB = fL. The
borrower obtains a rent following a bad signal when it turns out that revenue is actually
high, but zero rent following a good signal. This in turn implies that the principal always
monitors after good signal realisations (mG =1 ), while she never monitors after bad signal
realisations (mB =1 ). This can also be seen by looking at the participation constraint (14)
in programme P0
after:$ 1s p e n to nRHG relaxes the participation constraint more than if it
were spent on RHB since πHG−πLGcm/(fH −fL) >π HB−πLBcm/(fH −fL) . For the agent
t h ec o s tp e ru n i to fRHG is higher than RHB (πHG >π HB) but the diﬀerence is smaller than
for the principal. So the most eﬃcient action is to maximise RHG and minimise RHB. This
allows us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When 0 <α≤ 1, optimally RHG = fH and RHB = fL.
Given Proposition 1, the participation constraint takes the form
αEPCσ +( 1− α)
µ





− I =0 (15)
with EPCσ as deﬁned in (2). This leaves the question of the optimal values of RHN and
α conditional on maximum spread values of RHG and RHB. Here the diﬀering trade-oﬀs
to the two parties between RHN and α are important. They depend on the distribution
of revenues and on the costs of monitoring and signal acquisition. We can build up this
13trade-oﬀ by examining the slopes and relative slopes of the indiﬀerence curves (dU) and
the participation constraint (dPC) in RHN − α space ((35) and (37) respectively in the
Appendix). The shape of the indiﬀerence curves varies considerably with the level of utility.
Similarly, the shape of the participation constraint changes with the debt size. In general










Fig. 3. Constant revenue map
There is a particular utility level at which the agent’s indiﬀerence curve is horizontal (his
utility at that level is independent of α); lower utility level indiﬀerence curves have a positive
s l o p ea n da r ec o n v e xi nα, while higher level indiﬀerence curves have a negative slope and are
concave in α. Similarly, there is a particular debt size at which the participation constraint
(15) is also independent of α; for higher debt sizes it has positive slope and is concave in
α, while for lower debt sizes it is downwards sloping and convex. In fact this critical debt
size occurs when EPCσ =0 . If EPCσ > 0 the participation constraint has a negative slope,
whereas if EPCσ < 0 the participation constraint has a positive slope.
One would then expect a variety of alternative optimal possibilities. However, remarkably,
there is one simple condition, which is independent of the debt size and the support of
revenues and depends only on exogenous parameters, which serves to determine the relative
slopes of the participation constraint and the indiﬀerence curves. Deﬁning
πHca − ρcm = NCa, (16)
the slope of the participation constraint is everywhere greater than that of any indiﬀerence
curve which crosses it at some RHN and α if NCa < 0; it is smaller if NCa > 0; the
participation constraint coincides with an indiﬀerence curve if NCa =0 .
14The expression NCa is fundamental in capturing preference diﬀerences between principal
and agent. It depends on the relative costs of signal acquisition and monitoring and also
on features of the joint probability distribution of signal and state. If ca =0 ,N C a ≤ 0
and the participation constraint is steeper than any indiﬀerence curve. This leads to an
optimum with signal acquisition. If cm =0 , then NCa ≥ 0 and information acquisition
becomes unattractive relative to monitoring. This is also the case if ρ =0so that
the signal is completely uninformative. In the case of perfect correlation between the
signal and the state, πH = πHG,πL =1− πHG and NCa reduces to πH[ca − πLcm] and
EPCσ = πHfH + πLfL − I>0. Then, the sign of NCa depends on the diﬀerence between
the signal acquisition cost and the expected audit cost, i.e. the costs of policing the agent
by the alternative policies available. Combining this condition with EPCσ (whose sign
determines the slope of the participation constraint, dPC), has some implications on the
slope of the indiﬀerence curves dU, as reported in Table 1.
dPC NCa dU
> 0 > 0 ?
> 0 < 0 > 0
< 0 > 0 < 0
< 0 < 0 ?
Table 1: Slopes
When NCa > 0, the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between RHN and α is below
that of the principal (the slope of the participation constraint is higher than the slope of the
indiﬀerence curves) and we obtain solutions at α =0 .T h i si st r u ew h a t e v e rt h es i g no ft h e
slope of the indiﬀerence curves or participation constraints (Figs. 4a and 4b). Fig. 4c shows
the case in which EPCσ < 0 and NCa > 0. Since utility decreases with α, and both curves































4c. EPCσ < 0,NC a > 0.
This gives the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When NCa > 0, whatever the sign of EPCσ, it is optimal to gather no
information (α =0 ). The optimal contract has:
RHN =
(I − πLfL)(fH − fL) − fLπLcm
πH (fH − fL) − πLcm
= RHN|VI (17)
the value of the objective function is
Uα=0 =
πH (fH − fL)(πHfH + πLfL − I − πLcm)
πH (fH − fL) − πLcm
(18)
The monitoring probability is
mN|α=0 =
I − fL
πH (fH − fL) − πLcm
< 1 (19)
When NCa > 0, although signal acquisition buys precision in targeting repayments, this
is so costly that the agent prefers to meet the cost of the participation constraint solely
through RHN and induce the principal not to gather the signal (α =0 ). The result is the
standard commitment CSV contract (Border and Sobel, 1987).
On the other hand when NCa < 0 we will get solutions with a positive value of α. Typical
examples are shown in Figures 5 and 6. When EPCσ > 0,b o t hloci are downward sloping,












Fig. 5. EPCσ > 0,NC a < 0:α = α.
Since the agent has a stronger aversion to RHN relative to the cost of additional signalling α
than the principal does, it would be optimal to raise α and lower RHN as much as possible.
However, the lowest possible value of RHN sets RHN = fL and at this value
α =
I − fL
πHG(fH − fL) − πLGcm − ca
= α < 1
Intuitively, since EPCσ > 0, it is possible to meet the participation constraint mainly from
repayments following reports made after the signal has been received. As a result mN =0
and α = α < 1 with RHN = fL. Hence the twin conditions NCa < 0 and EPCσ > 0 lead to
an optimum in which 0 <α<1,a n dmB = mN =0 ,m G =1 .
If NCa,EPC σ < 0, both loci have a positive slope. Here utility is decreasing in RHN and
increasing in α. Again the optimum will tend to involve a high value of α but also a high value
of RHN.S i n c eEPCσ < 0 there is a shortage of revenue following signal acquisition. Even
if mG =1 , the participation constraint cannot be met solely from repayments arising from
post-signal reports (remember mB =0 ), so more revenue must come from no signal states.
These states give maximum revenue if RHN = fH in which case for a binding participation
constraint the highest possible signal acquisition rate is α = α<1 where
¯ α =
Ef − I − πLcm
πHB(fH − fL) − πLBcm + ca
.
The solution is to set RHN at its highest possible rate and monitor all low reports in cases
in which the signal is not acquired (mN =1 ). This generates the necessary revenue for the











Fig. 6. EPCσ < 0,NC a < 0:α = α.
Projects whose expected revenue with signal collection exactly cover the investment, audit
and information cost (EPCσ =0 ) give full information gathering. In this case there is no
need to raise additional revenue from the no signal state. So the signal is acquired for sure
even if costly.
Summarising, when NCa < 0 we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When NCa < 0 and ca > 0, and the degree of correlation between signal and
state is not too high,11 it is optimal to randomly or always gather information. The actual
values of RHN,m N and α vary with the sign of EPCσ.I np a r t i c u l a r :
i. (MSa)I fEPCσ > 0, the unique optimum is to randomly gather information (0 <α<1
and increasing in cm); RHN = fL and mN =0 . This gives:
α =
I − fL





(fH − fL){πHB(I − fL)+πHEPCσ}
πHG(fH − fL) − πLGcm − ca
(21)
ii. If EPCσ =0 , it is optimal to always gather information (α =1 ). The value of the
objective function is
Uα=1 = πHB(fH − fL) (22)
11For a higher degree of correlation, cases ii and iii might not arise.
18iii. (MSb)I fEPCσ < 0, it is optimal to randomly gather information (0 <α<1 and
decreasing in cm); RHN = fH and mN =1 .T h i sg i v e s :
¯ α =
Ef − I − πLcm





(Ef − I − πLcm)πHB(fH − fL)
πHB(fH − fL) − πLBcm + ca
= απHB(fH − fL) (24)
When NCa =0 , the marginal rates of substitution between RHN and α are equal for
the principal and the agent. The principal is indiﬀerent between not collecting the signal,
paying RHN = RHN|VI(17), or collecting it with positive probability and paying a repayment
conditional on each signal-state combination. This gives the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If NCa =0(and still ca > 0)w i t ha n ys i g no fEPCσ, any combination of
RHN ∈ [fL,f H] and α ∈ [0,α] which satisfy the participation constraint (15) is possible. The




(fH − fL)(πHfH + πLfL − I − cmπL)πH
πH (fH − fL) − πLcm
(25)
which is identical to that with no signal acquisition Uα=0 (18).
4.2 Costless signal acquisition
Some special features arise when ca =0 . If the signal is informative and free one might
expect that it will always be gathered (α =1 ) , but whilst this is one possibility there is in
fact an equally good possibility in randomly acquiring the signal at any interior rate and
adjusting the monitoring probability. For example, if EPCσ > 0 we can show that mB =0
but if α =1then there is random monitoring following a good signal. On the other hand,
setting α at any level in the interval α ≤ α<1 also involves mB = mN =0and again
random monitoring after a good signal but at a rate m0
G ≥ mG (rising to m0
G =1at α). It
turns out that the lower chance of being in the good signal state from reducing α exactly
compensates for the increased frequency of monitoring after the good signal has been realised
19so that the expected deadweight loss of monitoring is identical with any α ≤ α ≤ 1. Exactly
t h es a m eh a p p e n sw h e nEPCσ < 0 but now with the value of mB adjusting. Setting α =1
allows a lower value of mB than with α<1 but the higher chance of being in the bad signal
state when α =1just balances the reduction in mB. Again any α in the interval ¯ α ≤ α ≤ 1
with associated values of mB (mB =1at ¯ α but 0 <m B < 1 for α>¯ α) is equally eﬃcient.
Proposition 5 If ca =0 , and still the degree of correlation between signal and state is not
too high, the repayment structure and the signal dependent monitoring probabilities depend
on the sign of EPCσ :
i. when EPCσ > 0,R HB = fL and mB =0 . There are inﬁnitely many optimal
possibilities with mN = mB =0 ,α≤ α ≤ 1:
RHG = fL +
(I − fL)(fH − fL)




α[πHG(fH − fL) − πLGcm]
≤ 1
The value of the objective function coincides with Ua
MS.
ii. when EPCσ =0 ,R HG = fH,R HB = fL,m G =1 ,m B =0 . It is optimal to always
gather information and the value of the objective function coincides with Uα=1.
iii. when EPCσ < 0,R HG = RHN = fH, and mG = mN =1 . There are inﬁnitely many
optimal possibilities with α ≤ α ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ mB < 1
RHB = fH −
(fH − fL)(πHfH + πL(fL − cm) − I)
α[πHB(fH − fL) − πLBcm]
<f H
mB =1 −
πHfH + πL(fL − cm) − I
α[πHB(fH − fL) − πLBcm]
≥ 0
The value of the objective function coincides with Ub
MS.
The intuition for these results can be found by looking at the expected audit and signal
collection costs under EPCσ > 0: EC = α(ca + πLGmG). A variation in α has two eﬀects
20on EC: it varies directly the cost of signal collection, but it also varies the expected audit
cost through the indirect variation in the frequency of audit. When the signal is costless,
the ﬁrst eﬀect is null and only the second eﬀect is at work. A variation in audit probability
is therefore exactly compensated by an equal opposite variation in the frequency of signal
collection. When the signal is costly, also the ﬁrst eﬀe c ti sa tw o r k ,a n dt h ee x t r ac o s to f
an increase in audit probability is more than oﬀset by the saving induced by a reduction
in signal acquisition cost. This also explains the primacy of deterministic monitoring under
costly signal collection (Proposition 3). A similar argument holds also for EPCσ < 0.
The solutions just seen under costly and costless signal collection are sketched in Fig. 7,
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Indifference line between D<1 and D=1
Fig. 7. Signal strategy as a function of monitoring and signal acquisition cost.
As argued above, Propositions 3 and 5 hold for a suﬃciently low degree of correlation between
signal and state. For higher degrees of correlation some of these solutions, namely ii and iii
in Propositions 3 and 5, may not arise. To see why, consider the three relations EP =0 ,
EPCσ =0 ,EM B =0in ca − cm space. These are linear and their slopes are such that the
line EMB is vertical, while EP =0and EPCσ =0are each downward sloping, with EP =0











(fH − fL)+fL − I
21Since EP > 0 from assumption 1 and EMB > 0 from assumption 2, we can conﬁne attention
to the area below the EP line and to the left of the EMB line. Three possible scenarios can
arise depending on the degree of correlation between signal and state. These are depicted
in the following diagrams,12 with the area of feasible solutions inside the solid red and blue







































Using Propositions 2 to 5, the expected utility of collecting the signal after the contract is:
EUafter = Ef − I − α(
P
σ πLσmσcm − ca) − (1 − α)πLmNcm (26)
4.3 Signal strategy as a function of acquisition and audit costs
The previous results allow us to analyse how the signal acquisition strategy varies with ca and
cm. When NCa < 0 and EPCσ ≥ 0, the optimal probability of signal acquisition increases
at an increasing rate with the monitoring cost and the signal acquisition cost. On the other
hand, when EPCσ < 0,t h eo p t i m a lα starts decreasing in both the monitoring cost (at a
decreasing rate) and signal acquisition cost (at an increasing rate).
The α(cm,c a) function is continuous (except when NCa =0 ) and has a kink at its
maximum, which occurs where EPCσ =0 .A tﬁrst sight it is surprising that α can increase
with ca. Starting from a point at which MSa is optimal (and so mN =0 )( c a s ei, Prop.
3), there is a large saving from not monitoring no signal states. But as ca rises, to satisfy
12This can be seen by looking at the south-east direction of movement of the intersection of the three lines
as correlation decreases: the value of cm increases from zero to πHB
πLB (fH − fL)=πHG
πLG (fH − fL) > 0, while
the value of ca decreases from πHfH + πLfL − I>0 to fL − I<0.
22the participation constraint, some extra revenue must be generated and the only way of
doing this is to increase α. In this sense higher information acquisition substitutes for costly
monitoring. If initially cm is high enough,13 as ca rises α c a ni n c r e a s ea l lt h ew a yt oα =1 ,
completely substituting the signal for monitoring in both the no signal and bad signal states.
For lower initial values of cm,αcan only rise so far. Eventually, for any initial value of cm,
as ca gets high enough, α falls discontinuously to zero. This pattern is depicted in ﬁgure 9.
EPCV=0 NCa=0
D




Fig. 8. α(cm) for ca > 0
EPCV=0 NCa=0
D
UMSa ca UMSb U0
D 
Fig. 9. α(ca) for cm > 0.
A similar pattern arises if we increase cm, keeping ca ﬁxed, as depicted in ﬁgure 8. In this
case, if ca is low enough,14 α can increase all the way to α =1 , a n dt h e nd e c r e a s e su n t i lcm
is so high to violate assumption 1. Obviously, utility falls as acquisition and monitoring cost
rise. It falls continuously as ca and cm rise, but with kinks when the sign of NCa and EPCσ
changes, as depicted in Figures 10 and 11 in the Appendix.
5 Signal gathered before the contract
We now turn to the case in which a signal is collected before any contract oﬀer. Solving
programme P0
b4,w eﬁnd that the contract has the same qualitative properties as the
commitment contract with no information gathering, in particular random monitoring. The
decision to gather information before any contract oﬀer is made has nonetheless an impact
on the amount of monitoring that is carried out after each signal state.
13More precisely, for cm no less than the level at which EPCσ and NCa intersect, i.e. cm >
πH[πHGfH+(1−πHG)fL−I]
πHπLG+ρ
14I.e., for ca <
ρ[πHGfH+(1−πHG)fL−I]
πHπLG+ρ , the value at which EPCσ and NCa intersect.
23Proposition 6 W h e nt h es i g n a li ss u r e l ya c q u i r e db e f o r et h ec o n t r a c to ﬀer, the contract has
high state repayments:
RHσ|b4 =
(fH − fL)(I + ca) − πL|σfL (fH − fL + cm)




I + ca − fL
πH|σ (fH − fL) − cmπL|σ
,
with mG|b4 >m B|b4; and agent’s ex ante utility
EUb4 = Eπσ
∙
πH|σfH + πL|σfL − I −
πL|σcm(I + ca − fL)




The properties of the contract with costly monitoring and commitment (Border and
Sobel, 1987) are preserved under signal acquisition.
6 Determining the globally optimal signal strategy
To determine when to collect the signal, the agent compares the expected return when
the signal is collected before any contract oﬀer (27) with that obtained when the signal is
collected after a contract oﬀer is made (26). This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 7 It is never optimal to gather the signal before a contract has been agreed.
The agent will always strictly prefer to oﬀer the contract prior to learning whether
any signal has been acquired (and its value). So the right hand branch of the game tree
strictly dominates the left hand branch, i.e. allowing the agent to control the information
gathering strategy through the contract reduces agency costs more than leaving the choice
to the principal. This is due to the fact that the principal’s participation constraint
can be set in ex-ante terms in these circumstances. In particular, it can be written as
αEPCσ+(1− α)PC N = I.The possibility of cross-subsidisation between the diﬀerent signal
states means that if α =1the right hand branch must always at least weakly dominate the
left hand branch.
24If EPCσ =0optimally α =1and there is cross-subsidisation from the proﬁtable good
signal outcome to the bad signal outcome. Then the right hand branch strictly dominates
t h el e f th a n do n e .W h e ni nt h er i g h th a n db r a n c hi ti sn o to p t i m a lt os e tα =1 , we argue
that if we ﬁx α =1 , we must do worse in the right hand branch than with the optimal α.
But with α ﬁxed at 1 the right hand branch dominates the left hand branch. Hence when α
is allowed to take its optimal value, a fortiori the right hand branch must dominate the left
hand branch.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have considered a contract problem in which an agent proposes a project to a principal
generating private risky revenues which are subject to costly audit. The principal can choose
at any time to get a costly and imperfectly informative signal about future revenues, whose
realisation is freely available to the agent. The question is: should the principal get the signal
and if so when? What impact does the signal have on the audit strategy and the structure
of repayments in the contract?
There are three factors involved in the signalling acquisition decision. Firstly, since
collecting the signal reduces the uncertainty about future revenues, it allows the contract
to be written with more precise separation of the possible types of agent. Secondly, since
both the signal and audit are costly, it allows for a trade-oﬀ in control devices between
paying to reduce uncertainty by getting a signal and paying for auditing. Thirdly, there
are incentive eﬀects of the signal which work indirectly through the participation constraint
of the principal and the truthtelling constraint on the agent. For example, if the signal is
obtained, when it is good, the principal’s participation constraint is relaxed, which allows a
lower use of costly audits.
In contrast to most of the literature we allow for an endogenous timing of signal
acquisition. We ﬁnd that when the agent writes the contract and any signal acquired is
public, there is no gain in the principal acquiring the signal prior to the contract. It may be
25optimal to acquire the signal either for sure or randomly after the contract has been agreed.
But sometimes it is optimal for the principal to remain uninformed even after the contract by
never collecting the signal. Which of these is best depends on the relative costs of auditing
and of acquiring the signal and on the correlation between the signal and revenues.
When the signal is acquired prior to the contract, the assumptions about correlation of
signal and state and the potential expected returns in each post-signal position are crucial.
For example, if the correlation were perfect (or very high), a bad signal would perfectly (or
with high probability) predict the low state to both parties. Anticipating negative returns in
the low state, the agent would not oﬀer any contract at all and the ex-ante socially proﬁtable
project would not be carried out. At the analytical cost of limiting the correlation between
signal and state, we have abstracted from this problem to focus on the timing eﬀect of
the contract. This assumption in turn has ruled out the possibility that signal acquisition
completely substitutes for auditing, which occurs when a signal perfectly correlated with the
state is acquired after the contract.15
Finally, we have assumed commitment of the principal to audit and contractibility of
the signal acquisition strategy. As regards the ﬁrst, it is well known that for a truthtelling
contract to be credible, lenders must have some way of locking in to an agreed veriﬁcation
policy - some exogenous commitment device forcing the principal to audit low reports, even
though she knows them to be truthful (Hart, 1995). While a deterministic audit policy
can be enforced by third parties if the report and the contracted audit strategy are public,
this enforcement seems more problematic when the contract stipulates random audit, as it
is impossible to infer the strategy actually used by the principal just from observation of
whether an audit occurred (Khalil, 1997).16 By restoring deterministic audits, our paper
solves this problem.
The commitment problem to signal acquisition is rather diﬀerent. Since the signal
15Provided that the signal acquisition cost fell short of the expected audit cost.
16The principal could cheat on the realisation of the random device, either by using a public device with
the wrong odds or playing the device privately.
26outcome is public, whether a signal has or has not been acquired is automatically veriﬁable
by third parties. The commitment problem only arises with a contracted strategy that
requires random acquisition. Then, unless the principal is indiﬀerent between the expected
outcomes with and without the signal (α =1 ), she can try to cheat on the random device.
In our context, if EPCσ > 0 the principal has an incentive to acquire the signal for sure, if
EPCσ < 0 she gets a higher return from not acquiring the signal at all. So if there is no
external commitment device forcing her to follow the contracted random strategy, in both
cases she will cheat. Unless the actual random device used (e.g. the lottery) is observable by
the agent, if no signal emerges this could always be because either the principal did not play
the random device, or she did but no signal came back as the realisation. However, when
optimally the contract speciﬁes that the signal should always be collected (when EPCσ =0 ),
there is no longer an incentive problem over signal acquisition for the principal. Coupling
this with the optimality of deterministic audits implies that also this commitment problem
is solved without any external enforcement device. But in general the impact of lack of
commitment still needs study before strong conclusions can be drawn.
27A Generic Properties of the Contract
(i) the participation constraint must bind since otherwise the high state repayments can be
reduced.
Using the binding participation constraint to eliminate repayments the payoﬀ of the agent
becomes:
U = Ef − αca − α
P
σ πLσmσcm − (1 − α)πLmNcm − I
The monitoring cost is a deadweight loss.
(ii) and (iii) the truthtelling (TT) constraints must bind and there must be maximum
punishment RLHσ = fH − ca,R LHN = fH.
In all contracts the truthtelling constraint is
mσ(RLHσ − RLσ) ≥ RHσ − RLσ ≥ 0 σ = G,B,N
The deadweight loss of monitoring is minimised by raising RLHσ to its maximum level of
fH − ca (if α>0) and reducing mσ until the TT holds with equality. In the left hand
branch we must have mσ > 0 since otherwise, for some σ, RHσ = RLσ ≤ fL and there is
then insuﬃcient revenue to meet the investment cost.
(iv) low state repayments in all contracts are set to give zero surplus to the ﬁrm:
In the right hand branch (a similar argument applies to the left hand branch) after


























































fH−RLN (RLLN − cm)
o
≥ I
Forming a Lagrangian with multiplier λ, the FOC wrt RHσ is (a very similar expression
arises for RHN)
∂L








fH−RLσ ≥ 0,R Hσ ≤ fH
At the optimum λ>1.I fn o t ,t h eF O C ’ sw r tRHσ,R HN are all negative, so all repayments
are at most fL. But this would yield insuﬃcient revenue to the principal.




(fH−RLσ)2 {(λ − 1)(fH − RHσ)(fH − RLLσ)+λcm(fH − RHσ)} ≥ 0,R Lσ ≤ fL
This is positive and hence RLσ = fL. A similar argument holds for RLN.
28The FOC wrt RLLσ is (a similar expression arises for RLLN)
∂L
∂RLLσ : α(λ − 1)πLσ
RHσ−RLσ
fH−RLσ ≥ 0,R LLσ ≤ fL
This is positive (also for no signal state N) and hence optimally RLLσ = RLLN = fL. Hence
low state audited and nonaudited repayments are set to give zero rent to the ﬁrm.
B Signal after the contract
Using RLσ = RLLσ = RLN = RLLN = fL, we obtain programme P0
after, with mσ =
RHσ−fL
fH−fL ,
σ ∈ {G,B}, and mN =
RHN−fL
fH−fL , and remaining FOC’s as
∂L












∂α =( λ − 1)(πHGRHG + πHBRHB − πHRHN) − λ
³
πLGRHG+πLBRHB−πLRHN
fH−fL cm + ca
´
(31)
Proposition 1 is proved using the following Lemma.














∂RHG > 0, ∂L
∂RHN > 0;
(v) ∂L
∂RHG < 0 ⇒ ∂L
∂RHN < 0.
Proof. In (28)-(30) we can neglect the terms α,1 − α since if α =0 ,1 the associated
FOC and repayment is irrelevant. Then we have:
(i) ∂L
∂RHB/α =( λ − 1)πHB −
λπLBcm





∂RHG ≤ 0 ⇒ ∂L
∂RHB < 0; ∂L
∂RHB ≥ 0 ⇒ ∂L
∂RHG > 0.
(ii) If ∂L






fH−fL )=sign(πLGπHB − πLBπHG) < 0
So ∂L
∂RHG =0⇒ ∂L












(πHG+πHB)πHB − πLB)=sign(πLGπHB − πLBπHG) < 0.
29(iv) ∂L
∂RHB =0⇒ by (i) that ∂L







fH−fL )=sign(πLBπHG − πHBπLG) > 0.
(v) Similarly if ∂L
∂RHG < 0 and α<1 then ∂L
∂RHN < 0 since
∂L















∂RHG < 0 ⇒
∂L
∂RHN
(1−α)πHλ < 0 and so ∂L
∂RHN < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Note that it cannot be optimal to set RHG = RHB =
RHN = fH since then the participation constraint is slack and a rent is needlessly left to
the principal. Similarly it is not possible to set RHG = RHB = RHN = fL since then the
expected repayments do not meet the reservation level of the principal. Interior values of
RHG,R HB lead to a contradiction with the ﬁrst order condition on α :
1. ∂L
∂RHB =0⇒ ∂L
∂RHG > 0, ∂L




πHB(fH−fL)−πLBcm < 0, which is a contradiction.
2. ∂L
∂RHG =0⇒ 0 > ∂L
∂RHN > ∂L
∂RHB and RHN = RHB = fL. Solving for λ from (28) and
using (31) gives ∂L
∂α = −
πHGca
πHG(fH−fL)−πLGcm < 0. So this case is also impossible.
From the Lemma we must have one of the following cases:
i. ∂L
∂RHG > ∂L
∂RHN > 0 > ∂L
∂RHB;
ii. ∂L




∂RHG > 0= ∂L
∂RHN > ∂L
∂RHB.
In all of these cases we have RHG = fH,R HB = fL.
Using Proposition 1, the contract problem Pafter reduces to
max απHB(fH − fL)+( 1− α)πH (fH − RHN) (32)
s.t. α(πHGfH +( 1− πHG)fL − πLGcm − ca)+ (33)
+ 1−α
fH−fL [(πH(fH − fL) − πLcm)RHN + πLfL(fH − fL + cm)] ≥ I
Propositions 2 to 4 use the following Lemmas which deﬁne the relative slopes of the objective
(U) and the participation constraint(PC):
Lemma 2 G i v e nP r o p o s i t i o n( 1 )
(i) U is increasing in α, decreasing in RHN and convex in α and RHN if RHN >R HN|U;
(ii) U is decreasing and concave in RHN and α if RHN <R HN|U;
30(iii) if RHN = RHN|U, the indiﬀerence curve is independent of α.
(iv) PC is decreasing in α, increasing in RHN and concave in α and RHN if RHN >
RHN|VI;
(v) PC is increasing and convex in α and RHN if RHN <R HN|VI;
(vi) if RHN = RHN|VI, the participation constraint is independent of α;
where RHN|VI is the vertical intercept of the participation constraints, deﬁned in (17) and
RHN|U indexes an indiﬀerence curve along which the MRS between RHN and α is zero:
RHN|U =
πHGfH+πHBfL
πH >f L. (34)
Proof. (i-iii)D i ﬀerentiating (32) wrt α and RHN and taking the ratio
dRHN







(1−α)πH = dU (35)
While the sign of the denominator is positive, the sign of the numerator is ambiguous
depending on the value of RHN. It is increasing in RHN (
∂2RHN
∂α∂RHN|U =1 /(1 − α)) and zero
for RHN = RHN|U.N o t et h a tRHN|U >f L so the indiﬀerence curves have positive slope only
at relatively high values of RHN. Plotting the indiﬀerence contour, we ﬁnd that if downward
sloping, it is concave (
d2RHN
dα2 |U < 0), while if upward sloping, it is convex (
d2RHN
dα2 |U > 0).
(iv-vi) The participation constraint (33) can be written as:
αEPCσ +( 1− α)(PC N − I)=0 . (36)
Diﬀerentiating (36) wrt α and RHN and taking the ratio
dRHN











While the sign of the denominator is certainly positive, the sign of the numerator is
ambiguous. However, it can be inferred from the sign of EPCσ. For α ∈ (0,1), to satisfy
(36) with equality, if
· EPCσ > 0,PC N − I<0;
· EPCσ =0 ,PC N − I =0 ;
· EPCσ < 0,PC N − I>0.
From this we deduce that the sign of the numerator of
dRHN
dα depends on the sign of
EPCσ. If
• EPCσ > 0, ∂PC
∂α > 0 →
dRHN
dα |PC < 0;
• EPCσ =0 , ∂PC
∂α =0→
dRHN
dα |PC =0 ;
31• EPCσ < 0, ∂PC
∂α < 0 →
dRHN
dα |PC > 0.
Plotting the participation constraint, it has a pattern similar to that observed for the
indiﬀerence contour: when downward sloping, it is concave (
d2RHN
dα2 |PC < 0), while it is convex
when upward sloping (
d2RHN
dα2 |PC > 0).
Lemma 3 The participation constraint is steeper, ﬂatter or coincides with an indiﬀerence
curve if respectively NCa = πHca − ρcm R 0.
Proof. It suﬃces to take the diﬀerence in slopes (35) and (37), which is given by:
fH−fL
πH(1−α)(πH(fH−fL)−πLcm) (πHca − ρcm).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . If NCa > 0, at any point RHN,αthe participation constraint
is steeper than the indiﬀerence curve through that point. There are three cases:
(i) EPCσ < 0, the participation constraint has positive slope and at low values of α the
indiﬀerence curves crossing the participation constraint have positive slope but ﬂatter than
it. Here both principal and agent trade-oﬀ α and RHN positively, but the cost to the agent
of α exceeds that to the ﬁrm. The solution is to set α =0 ,R HN = RHN|VI.
(ii) EPCσ < 0, the participation constraint has positive slope and at low values of α the
indiﬀerence curves crossing it have negative slope. Here the agent will accept an increase in
RHN in exchange for a reduction of α at low values of α, whilst the principal is content to
decrease RHN with α. The solution is again α =0 ,R HN = RHN|VI.
(iii) EPCσ > 0, the participation constraint has negative slope and so does any
indiﬀerence curve which crosses it. The indiﬀerence curve falls more steeply than the
participation constraint: the agent is willing to accept a larger increase in RHN for any
reduction in α than the principal requires. The solution is α =0 ,R HN = RHN|VI.
Proof of Proposition 3. If EPCσ > 0, the participation constraint has negative slope
and when RHN = fL, the point on the participation constraint has α = α.T h ei n d i ﬀerence
curves always have a greater slope then the participation constraint (ﬂatter if negative or
otherwise positive). Hence the optimum is reached by raising α and reducing RHN as far as
possible resulting in RHN = fL,α= α, as depicted in Fig. 5.
If EPCσ =0 , the participation constraint is horizontal but the indiﬀerence curves have
positive slope and so are steeper than the participation constraint. The solution has α =1
along the participation constraint so that RHN = RHN|VI.
If EPCσ < 0, any indiﬀerence crossing the participation constraint must do so with
positive slope which is steeper than that of participation constraint. Hence the ﬁrm will
accept a higher increase in RHN than the lender and the optimum involves raising RHN and
α along the participation constraint to the highest extent possible. This occurs at RHN = fH
and a corresponding value of α = α set to satisfy the constraint, as depicted in Fig. 6.
Proof of Proposition 4. Here NCa =0 , which means that any indiﬀerence curve has
the same slope at each point as the participation constraint.
32If EPCσ > 0, the participation constraint is downward sloping. Given NCa =0 ,





α ∈ [α,0], where α is given by expression (20).





and α ∈ [0,α].
Proof of Proposition 5. Here ca =0which means that NCa < 0. Now the critical
repayments to be determined are RHG,R HB. There is a useful dependence between the FOC’s
















∂RHB when α>0, t h es o l u t i o nm u s th a v eo n eo ft h r e ef o r m s :
i. RHG ≤ fH,R HB = fL,g i v i n g0 <m G ≤ 1,m B =0 .
(a) Here ∂L/∂RHB < 0 but ∂L/∂RHG =0 . Hence ∂L/∂RHN < 0 if α<1and
RHN = fL. Then ∂L/∂α = ∂L/∂RHB(RHB − RHN)/α =0 , which conﬁrms that
α<1. Solving for RHG from the participation constraint






and mB = mN =0 . Any combination of RHG,α satisfying the inverse relation (38)
are optimal in this case. RHG can be no higher than fH at which value the minimal
corresponding α is α =
I−fL
πHG(fH−fL)−πLGcm < 1.
(b) Again ∂L/∂RHB < 0 but ∂L/∂RHG > 0 but now α =1 . So ∂L/∂RHN =0and
∂L/∂α = ∂L/∂RHB(RHB−RHN) > 0 which is consistent with α =1 . Solving for RHG
from the participation constraint






T h ee x p e c t e dd e a d w e i g h tl o s si ne i t h e r( a )o r( b )i si d e n t i c a l
EC = πLGαmGcm = πLG
(I−fL)cm
πHG(fH−fL)−πLGcm
For this to be an acceptable solution requires mG < 1. But we can write mG =
1 − EPCσ
πHG(fH−fL)−πLGcm and so this solution is valid when EPCσ > 0.
ii. When EPCσ =0 , then since also NCa < 0 we are in case (ii) of Proposition 3 and so
α =1 ,R HG = fH,R HB = fL.
33iii. RHG = fH,R HB ≤ fH.H e r e ∂L/∂RHG > 0 but ∂L/∂RHB ≥ 0 so mG =1and
0 <m B ≤ 1.
(a) ∂L/∂RHN > 0 if α<1 and RHN = fH,m N =1 . Moreover ∂L/∂α =0which is
consistent with α<1. Solving from the participation constraint for RHB






Any combination of RHB,αsatisfying the increasing relation (39) are optimal in this
case. RHB can be no higher than fH at which value the minimal corresponding α
is ¯ α =
Ef−I−πLcm
πHB(fH−fL)−πLBcm < 1. The expected deadweight loss is EC = α[(πLG +
πLBmB)cm +( 1− α)cm.
(b) If α =1 ,∂ L/∂RHN =0and ∂L/∂α = ∂L/∂RHG(RHG − RHN)/α > 0 which is
consistent with α =1 . Solving the participation constraint for RHB






The expected deadweight loss is EC =( πLG+πLBmB)cm. For this to be an acceptable
solution we need 0 <m B < 1. But mB = −EPCσ
EMB , so this requires EPCσ < 0.
Signal strategy as a function of acquisition and monitoring cost. We ﬁrst plot α





























17For this to be negative, we need EMB = πHB (fH − fL) − πLBcm > 0 at the value of cm at which
EPCσ =0 . This follows from assumption 1 and EP = EMB + EPCσ.




















We then plot U against ca and cm. For ca > 0 and increasing cm, optimally α =0and utility


























Last, for suﬃciently high cm, optimally still α>0, but utility is given by UMSb(expression












The pattern of utility for varying ca and cm is depicted in the following ﬁgures:
EPCV=0 NCa=0
U
UMSa cm UMSb U0 U1
Fig. 10. U (cm) for ca > 0.
EPCV=0 NCa=0
U
UMSa ca UMSb U0
Fig. 11. U (ca) for cm > 0.
35C Signal before the contract
Proof of Proposition 6. Using programme P
0
b4, solving the participation constraint for
RHσ|b4 =
(fH−fL)(I+ca)−πL|σfL(fH−fL+cm)









πH|σfH + πL|σfL − I − πL|σcm − ca
ª
.
Notice that mG|b4 <m B|b4 : 18
−(I−fL+ca)ρ(fH−fL+cm)
(πHG(fH−fL)−πLGcm)(πHB(fH−fL)−πLBcm) < 0.
D Globally optimal signal strategy
Proof of Proposition 7. Let Rb4 be optimal repayments in the left hand (LH) branch,
α,Rafter optimal signal strategy and repayments in the right hand (RH) branch.
Rb4 satisﬁes the truthtelling constraint (TT), the participation constraint (PC) in each
signal state Es|GPC G =0 ,E s|BPC B =0and the limited liability (LL) constraints of agent
Rsb4 ≤ fs.
The maximum payoﬀ in LH branch is EUb4 = πGEs|GUG(RGb4)+πBEs|BUB(RBb4).
The after contract has the same TT constraints and LL constraints and the PC of
principal is
α[Es|GPC G + Es|BPCB]+( 1− α)Es|NPC N
The maximum payoﬀ on RH branch is





[Es|GUG|Es|GPC G =0 ,TT G,LL G]+πB max
RB











18mG|b4 is decreasing in πH|G (and increasing in πL|G). Hence, receiving a good signal lowers the
probability of monitoring. This is because a better signal relaxes the principal’s participation and reduces
the repayment due to induce participation (RHG) ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e d u c e smG.
36In fact the ﬁrst inequality is strict since for α =1there is cross-subsidisation in the
participation constraint with the principal making a loss in the bad signal state and a gain in
the good signal state. α =1is optimal if EPCσ =0 . In other cases (EPCσ ≶ 0) optimally
α<1 in which case the second inequality is then also strict. Incidentally in these cases there
is also cross subsidisation in the diﬀerent parts of the ex-ante participation constraint but
now between the signal and no signal states.
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